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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
A. Game Background. 
The War Gaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College hosted the Maritime 
Domain Awareness (MDA) Operational Game on 18-23 July, 2010. Game 
sponsor was OPNAV N2/N6 on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM 
Gary Roughead.  
B. Game Purpose. 
To enhance information sharing with international partners for Maritime Domain 
Awareness in order to support International Seapower Symposium XX.  
C. Game Objectives. 
i. Examine regional MDA related relationships and networks in order to 
identify key elements of success, commonalities, and best practices. 
ii. Expose impediments to effective information sharing. 
iii. Identify options for broad based international maritime information 
sharing. 
D. Player information. 
i. MDA and MDA related information sharing experience was the primary 
criteria for CNO selection as a participating nation. 
ii. 38 players represented 12 invited nations. 
1. Participating nations were: Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, India, Italy, 
Japan, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, United States 
E. Commonalities discovered during the game. 
i. Maritime Domain Awareness is an accepted term with the following 
definition.  “The effective understanding of anything associated with the 
maritime domain (on, below, or above the sea) that could impact security, 
safety, economy, or environment of a nation. 
ii. Reasons for sharing information 
1. Receive information through reciprocal sharing 
2. Improve capacity of sharing partners to take actions which support 
one’s own national objectives (e.g., to interrupt in their own 
territory smuggling operations which affect both countries). 
iii. Interoperability within an information sharing coalition 
1. Information sharing must be voluntary in nature. 
2. Rules for sharing must be equally applied to all members. 
3. Information assurance must be resolved to the satisfaction of each 
member.  
iv. Impediments to information sharing. 
1. Lack of interagency process creates internal and external 
information sharing impediments. 
2. Integration of legacy systems and technologies has been a 
significant internal challenge.  
3. Domestic legal and policy restrictions inhibit internal and external 








F. Technology Integration. 
i. Each delegation expressed their preference to retain their current systems 
(regional) instead of adopting a new, common (Global) system. However, 
integrating extant systems into a global information sharing network was 
welcomed by all of the players. 
ii. Ideally, this multi-layer information-sharing architecture would be 
sufficiently adaptable and flexible, to cover new technologies over time 
and permit integration of legacy systems.   
iii. Players recommended taking an international approach to examining 
technical communication and networking interoperability between 
regional systems.  
iv. Identification of an information sharing structure - Analysis of the game 
and thousands of in-game sharing decisions surfaced four key elements of 
an acceptable international information sharing structure. 
1. A common commitment to share.  Under this construct, 
governments would endorse statements of principle in support of 
maritime safety and security through information sharing. An 
outcome of this activity would be that trust and confidence 
between governments endorsing these principles would increase; 
this increased trust and confidence was noted by the players as a 
necessary first step toward building any functional information 
sharing system. 
2. Global sharing.  The term refers to a sharing network or 
federations of networks that is global in scope and which carries 
information of the lowest sensitivity, namely ship characteristics 
and location data such as that broadcast on the Automated 
Identification System (AIS). Game results indicated that this 
structure provides the highest possible volume of sharing for this 
low level information due to the large number of members. In 
order to achieve the large membership that is critical to the 
effectiveness of this structure, the barriers to entry to join must be 
very low, permitting any government, agency, non-governmental 
organization or commercial entity to join. This produces an 
environment where information is shared nearly universally at a 
sensitivity level low enough to allay security concerns.  
3. Formal sharing.  This element provides a mechanism for the 
sharing of more detailed and sensitive information within smaller 
groups of participants. The key characteristic of this type of 
sharing is the presence of a formal agreement between the 
members that provides a legal or policy framework for the sharing 
of information.  
4. Ad-hoc sharing.  This type of sharing occurs where there is no 
formal agreement in place.  It allows for gaps between formal 









i. Initiate and support an initiative leading to a common commitment to 
share and which leads to endorsement of sharing principles by multiple 
countries.  
ii. Move forward with a structure for Global sharing either by creating a new 
arrangement to link existing MDA networks or greatly expand those 
networks that are already quite robust.  
iii. Move forward with the creation of formal sharing groups.  
iv. Work toward coalescing similar bilateral agreements into sharing groups 
in order to take advantage of the additional sharing volume inherent in 
group-based sharing.  
v. Build Ad-Hoc sharing relationships into more formal sharing agreements 











The Wargaming Department of the U.S. Naval War College hosted the Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) Operational Game on 18-23 July, 2010. The game was sponsored by 
OPNAV N2/N6 on behalf of the Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Gary Roughead. The game 
was held in McCarty Little Hall at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. 
The MDA Operational Game featured 94 participants including 38 players representing 
12 countries, all of which were selected based on their widely dispersed locations as well as their 
previous MDA and MDA-related information sharing experience. The following nations 
participated: Bahrain, Brazil, Colombia, India, Italy, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, Singapore, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.   
B. Background 
As declared in the U.S. Maritime Strategy, A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century 
Seapower and affirmed at the 19
th
 International Seapower Symposium (ISS XIX) in October 
2009, cooperative relationships between nations contribute to a secure and stable maritime 
domain. A focus of ISS XIX was the improvement of Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and 
the broadening of information sharing between nations and navies in support of it.  
In an effort to share ideas and initiatives that have been developed independently across 
the globe, the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Roughead, stated during ISS XIX 
that an international game would be held at the Naval War College to explore the operational 
implications of MDA.  
C. Purpose for this Study/Objectives 
The purpose of the game was to enhance information sharing with international partners 
for Maritime Domain Awareness in order to support ISS XX. In support of this purpose, there 
were three objectives:  
 Examine regional MDA related relationships and networks in order to identify 
key elements of success, commonalities, and best practices. 
 Expose impediments to effective information sharing. 
 Identify options for broad based international maritime information sharing. 
D. Research Questions 
In order to better understand the type of information that is shared across the various 
international information sharing structures, the MDA Operational game sought to deductively 
answer the following research question: “Based on the information sharing models that were 
employed in this game, what is the preferred structure for international information sharing that 





A supporting research question for this game was: “To what extent do interagency 
challenges within a country impact the ability to share information with other countries?” 
E. Identification of Hypotheses 
The MDA Operational game examined four specific hypotheses (H1-H4) and a null 
hypothesis (H0) on the subject of international maritime information sharing. These hypotheses 
were crafted after reviewing scholarly literature in the area of Maritime Domain Awareness, 
interviewing experts in the fields of MDA and international maritime information sharing, and 
examining existing international maritime information structures. The hypotheses studied in this 
one-sided game were framed from a multinational perspective.  These were as follows:   
H1: – In the Global unrestricted information sharing model, players will share a high 
volume of information with low detail.  
H2: – When compared with the Global unrestricted information sharing model, players 
using the Coalition Model will share a high volume with more detail.    
H3: - In the Bilateral Model, players will share the lowest volume of information, but the 
information that they do share will be the most detailed.   
H4: – The structure of information sharing that provides the most volume and detail will 
be a combination of models.   
H0: – Null: There is no relationship between the information sharing models employed 
and the volume and detail of information that is shared among maritime partners. 
III. GAME DESIGN & RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. Discussion of Game Design 
The week-long Maritime Domain Awareness Operational Game was conducted in two 
distinct phases.    
i. Phase One:  Idea Sharing 
Each player delegation presented a brief describing its nation’s internal MDA activities, 
external MDA information sharing efforts, and its expectations for the game. As each country 
delegation presented its brief, the other delegations had the opportunity to observe the successes 
and processes described in order to determine if their own country has experienced the same.  
Each brief lasted approximately 35 minutes long and was followed by a 10 minute 
question and answer period. While a template for this brief was provided to the player 
delegations by the game development staff, the national delegates were free to ignore the 
template and develop the brief as best fit their desires and presentation requirements. The 





 National Maritime Informational Sharing 
 
o Terms and Processes 
o Objectives 
o Participants 
o Successes and Challenges 
 
 Regional and Global Information Sharing Networks 
 
o Information Sharing Agreements 
o Objectives 
o Cooperative Efforts 
o Content 
o Successes and Challenges 
o The Way Ahead 
ii. Phase Two:  Information Sharing Game 
 The intent of the game was to further explore impediments to information sharing while 
considering options for international maritime information sharing structures that maximize the 
volume and detail of shared information. Players were placed in an environment in which they 
had to make decisions on whether information could be shared with other countries. The MDA 
Operational game consisted of three moves played over a two-day period.  During each of the 
game’s three moves, a different information sharing model was used: 
Move 1: Global Information-Sharing Model: In the Global information sharing model, all 
player cells were assumed to have voluntarily joined an information sharing structure which was 
open to a wide variety of entities: any other nation, agency, commercial interest, non-
governmental organization, and even organizations acting as fronts for illicit actors. Information 
was exchanged through a central unrestricted access data repository. Each participating entity 
was required to share some data into the central repository in order to have access to the 
information therein. It was assumed that there were extremely low barriers to membership in this 
sharing group, leading to a very large membership pool.   
Key characteristics of the Global Information-Sharing Model were: 
 All nations and organizations can participate  
 Membership requires a minimal sharing commitment 
 Barriers to participation are low or non-existent 
 Members cannot prevent any other nation from participating 
 Any information that is shared is shared equally with all members 
 
 












Move 2: Coalition Information-Sharing Model: In the Coalition Information Sharing model, 
information is shared among members of a coalition that had formally agreed to share 
information in support of MDA activities (although the limits of this agreement were 
purposefully left undefined).  The formal agreement was further understood to be in the nature of 
a treaty or memorandum of understanding (MOU) with legal standing between governments or 
agencies. The information is exchanged through a central data repository to which access is 
restricted exclusively to members. Only those countries that belong to the coalition are granted 
access to the data.  For purposes of this game, all 12 participating nations were considered to be 
members of the coalition. 








Key characteristics of the Coalition Information-Sharing Model are: 
 Membership is limited. Current coalition members must agree before a new member is 
allowed to join. 
 Information shared within the coalition model is secure. All sharing is conducted with 
information assurance measures in place that were suitable to all members.  





 Non-members do not have access to shared information. 
Move 3: Bilateral Information-Sharing Model: In the Bilateral Information-Sharing model, 
information was only exchanged between two countries. There was no multi-lateral organization 
and no central data repository. Further, there was no formal sharing agreement assumed or 
provided to the players. Beyond the few players whose nations have pre-existing real-world 
sharing agreements, all information sharing was considered to be ad hoc in nature.  








Key characteristics of the Bilateral Information-Sharing Model are: 
 Information is shared with one other nation at a time 
 No formal bi-lateral sharing agreement is to be assumed for the game unless it exists in 
the real world. 
 Information-sharing arrangements may be long-term or may be made before each 
information transaction 
 Participants can request that partners do not share further share information that they 
have provided, but they have no official means of enforcing that request.    
 
iii. The Decision to Share:  
 The key player activity was deciding whether or not to share a given piece of data. Each 
national cell was provided a set of 20-25 vessel reports, or “tracks,” which consisted of data 
elements ranging from basic ship characteristic and location information up to actionable details 
of illicit activity or detailed listings of crew or cargo as shown in the figure below. For game 
purposes, the information was categorized into four tiers as shown, with Tier 1 being the lowest 
















Making the decision to share information consisted of three main steps. First, the players 
needed to review the data to ensure that they understood the nature of the vessel. Second, they 
needed to put the vessel information in the context of their national policies and determine if 
there were prohibitions against sharing certain portions of the data. For example, would domestic 
privacy laws prohibit sharing crew lists or similar information? Other factors that the players 
needed to consider are listed in the figure below. After reviewing these factors, the players would 
decide what information could be shared and with which national cells it could be shared. The 
third step was then to apply this filtered data to the rules implicit in the sharing model in play for 
that move. For example, in move 1 or 2 when sharing to any one country required that the 
information be made visible to all countries, a decision by the first country to share to a second 
country could be overruled by the requirement that the information not be viewed by a third. 
Similarly, in the third move with the Bilateral model in play, the players could choose to share 
with only a single country and exclude all of the others. Analysis of the outcome of these 
thousands of sharing decisions was to provide the data to support accomplishment of the game’s 

















B. Game Design Assumptions 
The MDA Operational Game was designed based on a few key assumptions: 1) the 
maritime security environment is cooperative, not competitive (because improved maritime 
security is a stated objective of each of the countries represented in this game); 2) sharing, rather 
than withholding of information, is beneficial in achieving individual maritime objectives; 3) 
players were to assume that the maritime data used during the game was accurate and free from 
manipulation; 4) players were to assume that the information sharing network used during the 
game was secure and met their own information assurance requirements. 
Additionally, the game was conducted under a strict policy of non-attribution in order to 
ensure that conversations between players and moderators were as unrestricted as possible. For 
this reason, statements or comments that identify a specific player or nation will not be found in 
this report. 
C. Analytic Framing:  
In order to maximize the credibility of the analysis for this game, the analysis team 
sought to employ a variety of analytic tools.  The chief methodology used in this game to take 
advantage of multiple techniques was triangulation, which uses three sources or methods which 
are analyzed for commonality. This approach allowed game analysts to inductively derive the 
same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods. Consistent with this 
approach, the nine data streams collected during this game incorporated a variety of research 
procedures into analysis. A brief description of each analytic tool can be found in the Data 
Collection and Analysis Plan (Appendix D); along with a summary and figure representing the 





D. Collection Approach: 
The data collection protocol for the MDA Operational Game ensured that four specific 
areas are considered for analysis. These were:  
 The type of information the players decided to share over the course of the game.  
 The reasons players decided to share or not share information. 
 The implications derived from the types of information players decided to share or 
not share. 
During the game, four major data streams were examined by the Data Collection and 
Analysis Team (DCAT) at the conclusion of each move. Those data streams consisted of the 
following:  post-move track database summary graph, post-move sharing decision survey 
summary graph, Likert Scale and open-ended responses from the post-move player surveys. 
 Members of the DCAT individually examined each data stream and then came together to 
discuss initial findings for the move. The common themes that emerged from the overall real-
time data sets during the move were then provided to the facilitator in support of the post-move 
plenary session following the move. 
i. Sharing-Decision-Surveys 
Before the country cell releases information to their country representative located in the 
"trading cell", a survey of questions relating to the player’s decision to share and their 
assessment of the information displayed, prompting a response from the players. Specifically, 
these questions were designed to capture the impediments to sharing and the player’s decision-
making process associated with that specific track. The DCAT looked across each country’s 
database to identify common themes and issues that would feed directly into the post-move 
plenary discussions. Details of the Sharing-Decision-Surveys are in Appendix D. 
ii. Construct Validity for Questionnaires/Survey Instruments 
In addition to these deliverables, each of the country player cells had the opportunity to 
provide direct, functionally-oriented insights into the broader aspects of international information 
sharing. At the conclusion of each move, players from each cell completed surveys via InRelief 
focusing on the cell’s specific activities (i.e., why the cell ultimately made their decision to share 
or not to share the information) as well as overarching issues germane to their efforts to share 
information. The surveys were administered using each of the network terminals located inside 
each of the country cells and trading cell. 
All questions included in the post-move surveys were pre-tested (along with assessing 
overall instrument efficacy) during the Alpha and Beta tests with a small sample of individuals 
from the Naval War College. Great care was taken to ensure survey questions did not presuppose 
a desired outcome on the part of the researchers or "skew the agenda”. Please see the Data 







This game was designed for an optional national delegation of four players. These were 
to be two representatives from the navy, one from that nation’s foreign service, and one from a 
non-navy user or provider of MDA-related information. However, some player delegations were, 
for a variety of reasons, incomplete by this standard. As described in Appendix A, the players 
were predominantly from their nation’s navies and there were several delegations that did not 
have foreign service or non-navy representation. The impact of this is that the ability of the 
analysis team to draw conclusions about interagency issues from game results is limited as those 
conclusions are heavily based on navy-only opinions.  
IV. ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
Highlights of the two phases of the game are presented below as an introduction to the 
issues which lead to the themes, insights and recommendations which are discussed later in this 
report. A more in-depth description of player activities and results can be found in Appendices E 
and F. 
A. Idea Sharing Phase 
In the Idea Sharing Phase, national delegates presented briefings on their own nation’s 
MDA systems, successes and best practices, MDA-related impediments to information sharing, 
and their future expectations for regional and global MDA-related information sharing. During 
the game several key characteristics of successful MDA sharing enterprises were identified. The 
first was that successful MDA information sharing was characterized by a large number of 
participants who had achieved a degree of trust and confidence with each other to enter into 
sharing commitments. Numerous sharing relationships, discussed in the first phase of the game, 
were all founded on mutual trust and confidence.   
These successful sharing relationships were characterized by one of three main structures 
for sharing. The first structure used a centralized data server located in a single country which 
each participating country could connect to for the purposes of contributing and retrieving data. 
The VRMTC, VRMTC-A, ReMIX and MSSIS systems follow this model. In comparison to this 
structure stood the concept of connecting domestic information servers using secure internet 
tunnels such as employed in the Scandinavian SUCBAS system, which allowed each nation to 
retain physical possession of the storage of their information. The third major concept employed 
is the liaison officer based model such as in Singapore’s regional Information Fusion Center. 
This model permits nations to rapidly respond to regional crises through cooperative, face-to-
face sharing of information. 
Players exhibited several key common understandings which indicate that expanded 
international maritime information sharing is possible. First, players agreed nearly unanimously 
that the definition of MDA presented for the game was suitable. This definition was: Maritime 
Domain Awareness is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime 
domain (on, below, or above the sea) that could impact security, safety, economy, or 





need for a legal framework. Lastly, players identified two pragmatic reasons for sharing: First, to 
receive information through reciprocal sharing, and second, to improve the capacity of sharing 
partners to take actions which support one’s own national objectives (e.g., to interrupt in their 
own territory smuggling operations which affect both countries).   
B. Summary of the Information Sharing Game  
In summary, the post-game analysis supported hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, and partially 
rejected hypothesis 3. The volume of information shared was lowest in the Bilateral model, as 
predicted. Shared detail was found to increase from the Global model to the Coalition model as 
expected, but did not increase further in the Bilateral model, contrary to the premise of 
Hypothesis 3. For detailed results of each move, see Appendix F. 
V. GAME DERIVED THEMES & INSIGHTS 
These themes, insights and player recommendations were derived from analysis of actual 
information sharing conducted during the game, player commentary during plenary sessions, 
sharing decision survey results and post-move survey results.   
A. The Relationship between Trust & Confidence and International 
Information Sharing 
Observations 
 Trust and confidence within each model became extremely influential in the decision-making 
process, particularly in the Coalition Model. The players released more information, and 
were willing to share a greater percentage of information released as a result of the increased 
security of a coalition environment.  
 Player statements indicated that trust enables sharing agreements, while at the same time 
manifesting them.  
 Various players noted that the coalition model is key to “opening the door” to greater 
information sharing.  However, development of trust occurs over a period of time and must 
begin with very basic unclassified data. 
Insights 
 As expressed by the players during numerous plenary discussions, the importance of 
establishing trust and the willingness to share are the fundamental factors that enhance 
awareness and build partnerships.  
 Trust is also influenced by the level of confidence one nation has in another in their ability to 
safeguard and protect information, and also act responsibly with that information. 
 Overwhelmingly, players noted that respect and acceptance of individual nation’s 








 Revitalize and improve regional partnership building initiatives in order to enhance trust and 
confidence among international maritime partners beginning with very basic agreements.  
B. The Relationship between “Push” and “Pull” Information Sharing Strategies 
Observations 
 Throughout game play, players often noted the various “push” and “pull” factors associated 
with information sharing. Players “pushed” information for several reasons.  Some pushed 
information to get more in return.  Some players only pushed non-sensitive or Tier 1 
information, while others pushed more sensitive information (e.g., Tier 2-4) because they 
perceived it to be in the common interest of the international community.   
 Players did not push information when they perceived that there was too much data to review 
for release.  They did not feel comfortable pushing out data without at least reviewing it for 
sensitivity and security issues.  
 Other players noted that push strategy works well only if it is possible for the recipient to 
search and filter the data in an effective way. Pushing large quantities of information and 
highlighting “interesting data” could represent a compromise solution.   
 Some information was not released or shared until it was requested (pulled) by another 
player. Players believed that pulling information works better in a bi-lateral or regional 
sharing relationship.  
 One of the major disadvantages of pulling noted by several players was the concept that “you 
don’t know what you don’t know” meaning that a pull strategy would not be successful in 
finding unknown threats.   
Insights 
 These two strategies were employed differently during each move in the game. Push was 
used more in situations with high trust, such as in the Coalition model or where real world 
sharing relationships existed. Pull was used where there was an evident lack of a pre-existing 
sharing agreement.   
 The application of the push strategy in the Coalition model was the key factor to convert the 
trust inherent in that model’s relationships into high volume and detail of sharing. 
C. Interagency Coordination and its Impact on  International information 
Sharing 
Observations 
 Players noted throughout the event that individual nations need to solve their interagency 
information sharing issues before they can be counted upon to be able to share the full 








 Information that is shared internationally through specific domestic channels (i.e., customs or 
law enforcement) must be fused and analyzed through an interagency process. Only then will 
MDA be achievable. 
 The UK is dealing with the interagency challenge through the development of a single 
agency which will handle consolidation and sharing of all maritime information.   
 Nations identified navies as key players in Maritime Domain Awareness; but as one small 
“piece to the larger MDA Puzzle”.   
 In order to better understand a navy’s role in Maritime Domain Awareness, a robust 
understanding of the interagency process and the roles, responsibilities and capabilities of 
each domestic organization is imperative.  
Player Recommendations 
 An internal examination of individual interagency processes and procedures and their 
relationship to external sharing is needed in each respective nation. 
D. An International Legal Framework 
Observations  
 Legal and policy challenges emerged both during the country briefings and throughout the 
game as the major impediments to international information sharing.  
 The presence of a legal framework in the Coalition model was cited as the major contributing 
factor that led to that model supporting high volume and the greatest detail of information 
shared. 
 Creation of an international legal and policy working group was proposed as a mechanism 
for developing widely acceptable legal structures.  
Insights 
 Sharing could be facilitated by an international legal body empowered to establish and 
govern international data standards and protocols. ICAO was offered as a possible model. 
 Leverage existing international law (e.g., UNCLOS, SUA, UNCR) to encourage formal 
agreements. The Regional Co-Operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships in Asia (a Singapore led initiative) was discussed as an ideal model.  
 Some players stated that they would view these initiatives more favorably if a United Nations 
(UN) chartered body like the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was involved. 
 There are many existing maritime and non maritime information sharing models that 





operational framework that supports information sharing within a sharing group. Many of 
these models include but are not limited to:  
Virtual Regional Traffic Center (VRMTC), Maritime Safety and Security Information 
System (MSSIS),  Trans-Regional Maritime Network (TRMN), Sea Surveillance and Co-
Operation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS), Regional Maritime Information Exchange System 
(ReMIX), Regional Co-Operation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia, Interpol, International Criminal Police Organization; ASEAN, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and the PSI, Proliferation Security Initiative. 
Player Recommendations 
 An international legal and policy working group dedicated to examining these issues would 
be valuable. 
 While many cooperative-sharing models exist, leveraging on-going efforts from regional and 
trans-regional maritime and non-maritime information should be enhanced.    
E. Fusion and Analysis 
Observations 
 Players realized that the capacity to perform fusion and analysis on maritime data was a 
critical element in the ability to share maritime information and build maritime partnerships. 
Many players noted that possessing high quantities of data is only valuable if you can make 
sense of it.  
 Moreover, players discussed that much of the technology used to fuse and analyze data with 
their respective regional systems is in early developmental stages and may not support 
integration with other networks.  
 Various robust commercial off –the-shelf tools and software that may offer some capabilities 
to fuse and analyze large amounts of disparate information were discussed. 
Insights 
 Numerous entities, including some which participated in the game, have demonstrated fusion 
and analysis systems that would address the integration and sense-making limitations raised 
by the players.  
Player Recommendations  
 A technology feasibility study was suggested to examine functionality and compatibility of 







F. Regional Partnership Building 
Observations  
 Players agreed that some nations are unable to participate in information sharing due to 
inadequate or non-existent technical, legal or operational infrastructure. 
 Player described regional partnership building efforts focused on increasing partner capacity 
as having been fruitful, but will need to be improved in order to expand information sharing 
globally.  
 Insights 
 Many nations, including some in attendance for the game, support less capable nations in 
achieving the means to contribute to an information sharing initiative. This assistance has  
come in the form of technology (such as radars, sensors, servers and systems), manpower, 
training, or financial assistance.  
 Regional maritime collaboration events have helped educate and break down barriers within 
nations and regions. However, many of these efforts are duplicative and uncoordinated. 
Player Recommendations  
 The international community should endorse a multinational outreach and coordination 
group, headed by regional maritime leaders, dedicated to education and the integration of 
regional Maritime Domain Awareness and information sharing efforts.  
 
G. Supporting Capabilities in an Information Sharing System 
Observations  
 Player responses to a survey question requesting that they identify tools that would be 













Data Fusion & Analysis 
 
50% 
Electronic Mail (E-Mail) 
 
67% 
International Unclassified News Feeds 
 
42% 
Integrate information from other systems & sensors 
 
58% 










Ship Information "Wiki" or information database 
 
50% 
 In addition to the tools listed above, a significant number of players indicated that a 
capability for combined chat, VTC and voice communications would be useful. The 
players identified the commercial service Skype as a potential model for this capability. 
 The InRelief.org website, a US Navy sponsored non-classified enclave intended to 
increase the speed of collaboration for immediate responders to humanitarian relief or 
disaster response operations, was used extensively during the game. This website proved 
to be very versatile and was praised by the players for its ease of use, collaborative tools 
and flexibility. 
Player Recommendations  
 Incorporate the above listed capabilities in future information sharing networks. 
H. A Comprehensive Global Maritime Information Structure 
In the Information Sharing Game, players were divided into cells that were each tasked to 
evaluate a set of maritime data provided by the game controllers, determine if any of that 
information could be shared and then act on those decisions to share information with the other 
national cells. Analysis of the outcome of these thousands of sharing decisions provided the data 
to support accomplishment of the game’s objectives. The structure outlined here serves to meet 
the objective of the game to identify an option for wide-spread international information sharing 
structure. More specifically, this comprehensive structure is arranged to obtain the maximum 
possible volume and detail of information sharing for all participants using the results of the 
game as a guide. The proposed information sharing structure consists of four elements. 
A Commitment to Share: The first element can best be described as a common 
commitment to share. Under this construct, governments would endorse statements of principle 
in support of maritime safety and security information sharing. An outcome of this activity 
would be that trust and confidence between governments that had endorsed these principles 
would increase; this increased trust was noted by the players as a necessary first step toward 
building any functional information sharing system. The impact of widespread endorsement of 
these principles would be four-fold. First, pairs or groups of nations which have endorsed the 
information sharing principles would be more likely to enter into sharing agreements with each 
other because the endorsement would serve as a rudimentary legal framework for sharing. 
Second, endorsing nations would be more likely to enact domestic legislation in support of the 
sharing of maritime information. Third, changes to international law and other international legal 
frameworks in support of maritime information sharing would be more likely. Last, development 
of international working groups for technical, legal or policy matters related to information 
sharing could be accomplished under the umbrella of these endorsements.  
 Throughout the game, players emphasized all of these factors as critical to the expansion 
of information sharing. Promotion of widespread information sharing in support of MDA will 
require efforts to create an environment that provides individual nations, leaders and 
organizations with the confidence to enter into sharing relationships. As was repeated frequently 





addition to trust and confidence, all relationships, whether local, regional or global, require some 
framework upon which to begin the discussion which leads to a relationship.  
 Lastly, this regime would offer the legal framing which the players repeatedly noted as a 
necessary condition for sharing. For strategic level decision makers who are the ones developing 
formal and enduring information sharing agreements and for operational level decision makers 
who are most likely to engage in ad hoc information sharing, their government’s endorsement of 
information sharing in principle can weigh heavily on the decision to share, especially if the 
intended sharing partner has also endorsed.  
Additionally, a structure of this type could be used as the backbone for necessary 
leadership, planning and working groups which would work to facilitate the initiation of sharing 
agreements at all levels. For example, during the game players repeatedly called for the ability to 
work together to solve technical or networking problems, policy or legal problems, or even to 
collaboratively work together to find ways to improve basic MDA capabilities.  Groups of 
endorsing nations would be more likely to initiate and maintain these working groups. 
Global Sharing: The second element of the game-derived information sharing structure, 
entitled Global sharing, is a single sharing network or federated group of networks that is global 
in scope and which carries information of the lowest sensitivity, namely ship characteristics and 
location data such as that broadcast on AIS (characterized as Tier 1 in this game). Game results 
indicated that this structure provides the highest possible volume of sharing for Tier 1 
information due to the large number of members. In order to achieve the large membership that 
is critical to the effectiveness of this structure, the barriers to entry to join must be very low, 
permitting any government, agency, non-governmental organization or commercial entity to join. 
This produces an environment where information is shared nearly universally at a sensitivity 
level low enough to allay security concerns. Sharing at this level is premised on the idea that the 
massive volume of information received and disseminated globally has more value than the 
small amount of information that finds its way to bad actors. The last component of the structure 
at this level would be a series of focused working groups to resolve issues specific to the 
operation of this network. One solution to shorten the technology development process may be to 
expand existing MDA sharing networks to form the Global Sharing network. This would also 
serve to support national desires that legacy systems be integrated into newer sharing networks 
and not replaced wholesale. 
 While some players even shared more detailed information at a high volume using this 
sharing model, this was limited to a minority. The fact that not all players were willing to share 
information above Tier 1 in the global model is evidence in support of limiting the scope of this 
portion of the information sharing structure to Tier 1. Maximizing volume of information sharing 
is prioritized over increased detail of information because it is the number of members and 
contributors that gives information sharing its power. While consummating a sharing 
arrangement with nations that are willing to share detailed information very widely would at first 
appear to be beneficial, the reality would be that a majority of nations and organizations would 
choose not to join such an organization because of their own restrictions against sharing detailed 
information, thereby reducing the number of members and therefore the overall volume.  
 
Formal Sharing: Building on the sharing achieved at the very low levels of sensitivity, 





provides a mechanism for the sharing of more detailed and sensitive information within smaller 
groups of participants. The key characteristic of this type of sharing is the presence of a formal 
agreement between the members that provides a legal or policy framework for the sharing of 
information. Players noted that this type of formal agreement “opened the door” to information 
sharing. Another important factor is that membership to a sharing group can be limited in order 
to exclude undesirable recipients and permit the sharing of more sensitive data. Finally, because 
players recognized that the pragmatic benefits of sharing came not only from the receipt of 
information provided by a partner, but also in the improved readiness of all partners which is 
achieved through the widespread dissemination of information, it was determined that the size of 
the group must be as large as possible in order to keep the volume of sharing high enough to be 
effective. This second benefit can only be realized through the higher volumes achieved when 
partners that share bilaterally come together as a group to ensure that the available information 
spreads completely to all partners.  
 In using the coalition model in the game, players shared information widely within the 
group at all levels of detail. As has been pointed out in the discussion of the results, the coalition 
model had, for any single nation, the highest component of volume sharing (each cell shared the 
highest amount of information at each tier) as well as the highest detail of sharing (the highest 
degree of sharing Tiers 2-4). For Tier 1 information, this model was less efficient than the global 
model both in terms of globally disseminating information because fewer participants would 
receive the information, and in terms of the amount of information received by any individual 
participant. This drawback can be negated if this type of sharing is used in conjunction with a 
global sharing type arrangement for less sensitive data. 
 
Ad-Hoc Sharing: Because it would be impossible for all nations to participate in large 
formal sharing agreements due to political, diplomatic or legal restrictions, each nation will find 
gaps in its ability to share MDA information with other nations. These gaps can occur where no 
sharing agreement exists or where the sensitivity of the information exceeds the limits of an 
existing sharing agreement. A structural element to meet these shortfalls is voluntary Ad-Hoc 
Sharing. Ad-Hoc sharing events occur when there is no formal agreement in place to share the 
specific bit of data. This type of sharing can only augment Formal Sharing agreements because it 
produces the lowest volume of sharing and no more detail than Formal Sharing as observed in 
this game. While this type of sharing is a minor contributor when compared to Global Sharing 
and Formal Sharing, it should not be overlooked as it may often be the only possibility for 
sharing with certain entities due to political or diplomatic constraints. Further, sharing arranged 
in this manner can often lead to higher trust and confidence and eventually to a formal sharing 
agreement with a new partner. 
  
Summary: Hypothesis 4, which stated that a combination of sharing models would be 
needed to maximize volume and detail of sharing, has been supported by game play. This can be 
restated to say that in order for a single country to maximize the contribution that international 
information sharing makes to their overall MDA efforts, they must participate in multiple sharing 
activities which individually possess characteristics of one or more of the sharing models 
presented in the game. The information sharing structure described above will not fill the entirety 
of MDA requirements for any nation, but instead is assessed to be the best that can be done given 





MDA requirements not met through international information sharing must be met through 











What sharing structure maximizes the volume and detail of shared information?
Global Information Sharing
 
Relative contribution of the sharing elements to the comprehensive sharing 
structure 
Next Steps: There are several steps for nations to take that would bring the above 
described structure into reality. First, any country could initiate and support an initiative leading 
to a common commitment to share and which leads to endorsement of sharing principles by 
multiple countries. Second, countries should move forward with a structure for Global Sharing 
by creating a new sharing arrangement, linking existing MDA networks, or greatly expanding 
those networks that are already quite robust. Any country can move forward with the creation of 
formal sharing groups, but all should work toward coalescing their similar bilateral agreements 
into sharing groups in order to take advantage of the additional sharing volume inherent in 
group-based sharing. Lastly, any nation can work to build Ad-Hoc sharing relationships into 






Appendix A: Demographics 
I. Demographics. The MDA Operations Game featured 76 participants as follows: 
 37 Players from 12 Nations 
 13 Cell Facilitators 
 2 Plenary Facilitators 
 10 Technology Support Team members 
 6 Control Cell Team members 
 8 Data Collection and Analysis Team members 
 
Country # of Participants Years of Service Years of MDA Age
Bahrain 2 Mean 20.97 3.86 42.14
Brazil 3 Median 21 2 42
Colombia 4
India 3 Male 36
Italy 4 Female 1
Japan 4
Pakistan 2 Civilian 7
Singapore 3 Military 30
South Africa 2
Sweden 4 Graduate Degree 22
United Kingdom 3 Non-Graduate Degree 14
United States 3
Total 37  
A. There were a total of 37 participants from 12 countries involved in the game. The 
average participant was approximately 42 years old, had approximately 21 years 
of service, and had four years of experience with MDA. The participants were 
overwhelmingly male (36 of 37) and were predominantly military (30 of 37). All 
were college graduates with 22 of the 37 reporting graduate degrees.  
B. In addition to basic demographic information, each participant was asked a series 
of five survey questions with responses on a six-point Likert scale (ranging from 
6 – Strongly Agree to 1 – Strongly Disagree). The five questions follow: 
Q1: Maritime Domain Awareness is defined as the effective understanding of anything 
associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or 
environment of a nation.  I feel that this statement closely matches my country's interpretation 
even if we use a different term. 
Q2: When working in a team environment, I tend to assume a leadership role. 
Q3: When making difficult decisions, relying on my experience is just as important in my 
deliberation as available data. 





Q5: Based on my knowledge and experience of MDA, I believe that I have a sufficient 
understanding to assist my country team in achieving meeting the objectives set in the game. 
The basic summary statistics to the survey questions are presented in the table below: 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Mean 5.46 4.89 4.81 3.08 5.27
Median 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 5.00
Mode 6.00 5.00 5.00 4.00 5.00
Std Dev 0.56 1.05 0.97 1.32 0.65  
The frequency of responses for each of the five questions is presented in the following frequency 
distribution charts. 
 
Based on participant responses, we conclude that all players agree on the basic working 






Based on participant responses, we conclude that the vast majority of players tend to assume a 
leadership role when working with a team. This is important in the context of the game because 
all players should contribute to the team decision-making process. 
 
 
Based on participant responses, we conclude that most players agree that experience is an 







Based on participant responses, we conclude that most players disagree that instinct is an 
important part of the decision-making process. 
 
 
Based on participant responses, we conclude that all players agree that they are capable 





Appendix B: Glossary of Key Terms 
I. Definition of Key Terms 
Information Tiers: An artificial analytic construct developed for this game 
derived from pre-game research. This structure facilitates the segregation of data into 
sensitivity levels for ease of comparison. 
Tier 1: Lower sensitivity information such as that broadcast over AIS. Data fields 
for this tier are: name, flag, type, status, dimensions, draft, last port of call, next port of 
call, position, master nationality, owner, and owner nationality. 
Tier 2: Identification of a vessel as a vessel of interest (VOI). 
Tier 3: Brief identification of the reasoning for a VOI designation. For example, a 
VOI is suspected of human trafficking activity. 
Tier 4: Information of the highest sensitivity to include detailed or actionable 
descriptions of illicit activity, detailed crew lists or detailed cargo manifests. 
Scenario types: A minimum of one track from each of the below scenario types 
was presented to every national cell for sharing in each move. 
Own State Military – a military vessel from the sharing country 
Foreign Military – a military vessel from a country with which the 
sharing country does not have an existing partnership. 
Partner State Military – a military vessel from a country with which the 
sharing country has an existing maritime, military or information 
sharing partnership. 
Own State Law Enforcement – a vessel engaged in law enforcement 
(fisheries, EEZ, smuggling patrol etc) from one’s own country. 
Foreign Flagged Law Enforcement – a vessel engaged in law 
enforcement (fisheries, EEZ, smuggling patrol etc) from a country 
with which the sharing country does not have an existing 
partnership. 
 Own State Merchant – a commercial vessel from the sharing country 
Partner State Merchant – a commercial vessel from a country with 
which the sharing country has an existing maritime, military or 
information sharing partnership. 
Foreign Flagged Merchant - a commercial vessel from a country with 
which the sharing country does not have an existing partnership. 
Own State Owned Merchant / Foreign Flagged – a commercial vessel 
which is owned in the sharing country but which is flagged 
elsewhere (i.e., flag of convenience) 
Trafficking: Each national cell had two of the below four types of 





NARCO: a vessel engaged in narcotics trafficking. 
HUMAN: a vessel engaged in human trafficking or smuggling. 
PRODUCT: a vessel engaged in the smuggling of goods in order 
to avoid customs duties or to transport prohibited goods. 
WEAPONS: a vessel engaged in smuggling weapons. 
WMD Proliferation: a vessel engaged in materials related to WMD 
proliferation (knowingly or unknowingly) 
Terrorism Personnel or Equipment: a vessel engaged in transporting 
terrorism related personnel or materials, knowingly or 
unknowingly. 
Polluter: a vessel associated with illegal pollution. 
Fisheries Violator: a vessel associated with illegal fishing. 
Piracy Vessel: a vessel engaged in piracy. 
Piracy Victim: a vessel that is known to have been captured or attacked 
by pirates. 
Own State HADR Support: a vessel which is supporting humanitarian 
assistance or disaster relief and is associated with the sharing 
country either through flag, ownership or charter. 
Foreign Flagged HADR Support: a vessel which is supporting 
humanitarian assistance or disaster relief from a country with 
which the sharing country does not have an existing partnership. 
Health Contagion Risk: a vessel connected to outbreaks of deadly, highly 
contagious diseases (Hemorrhagic fever, SARS, Swine Flu, Bird 
Flu etc.). 
AIS Non-Squawker: a vessel which is observed to meet the requirements 
to transmit on AIS, but which is observed not to be doing so. 
Volume: In this game, volume is defined as the number of vessel reports that are 
shared with other countries multiplied by the number of recipients. Said another way, it is 
a measure of how widely maritime information is disseminated. As this applies to the 
models used in the game, a single vessel report shared with others increases from the 
bilateral model (a vessel is shared to one country… a factor of one) to the coalition model 
(a vessel is shared automatically to all eleven participants… a factor of eleven) and 
finally to the global model (a vessel is shared to all of the undefined recipients that are 
participating in the global model, assumed to be 3-10 times greater than the number in the 
coalition model… therefore for the purposes of these calculations, a factor of 33-110). 
Detail: Detail is defined as a measure of the sensitivity of the information shared 
for each vessel report. The data given to the players was organized into tiers by 
sensitivity with the least sensitive information being the name and flag of a vessel and the 
most sensitive being detailed information on a vessel’s crew, cargo, association with 





Appendix C: Game Mechanics 
I. Game Mechanics 
During each move of the game, each country was presented with a set of fictitious 
maritime data managed through a game-specific Web Tool located on the internal unclassified 
game network. In the real world, this information would have come from a variety of sources, 
such as domestic agencies or intelligence services, regional networks, open source information, 
or Automated Identification System reports. However, because the object of the game was to 
determine how much information would be shared and not to identify how a specific country 
handled classified or sensitive information, the source or method of obtaining that data was not 
provided to the players during the game. Further, the game design deliberately avoided asking 
the players or opening a discussion regarding information sources and methods because it was 
feared that this would suppress the free flow of discussion that was vital to the success of the 
game. 
Additionally, each country was provided a set of vessel related questions to answer. 
These questions could only be answered by receiving the necessary information from members 
of the other country cells. The scenario questions are designed to stimulate game play by 
providing an incentive to gather information. During game play, players were able to identify 
how many questions they had correctly answered and to determine the “scores” that had been 
obtained, but not which cells had attained which scores. This gave players motivation to pursue 
additional information in order to answer additional questions if behind, but not the ability to 
freeze information going to cells that were in the lead. In this game, correctly answering a 
question was roughly analogous to achieving an operational objective through MDA.  
Cell Organization 
Each nation’s participants were assigned to their country’s National Cell, located 
separately from the other participating nations. One member of each national contingent played 
alongside other multinational members to form a separate Multinational Information Trading 
Cell.  Each national team also had access via telephone and an electronic collaboration tool with 
their Home Country Operations Center.     
National Cells 
The National Cell reviewed the track database, answered questions, and determined what, 
if any, information was shared with other teams.  The National Cell communicated directly with 
its representative on the Trading Cell and had internet-based access to various resources, 
including personnel and information sources within their home country.  Members of the 
National Cell were able to contact personnel in their home nation for clarification and guidance. 
 The National Cell was not able to communicate directly with any other national team. 
Discussions within the National game cells during game play were kept private. The only 
information that was shared with other countries was that of which each trader specifically 
designated for sharing. All communications with other teams were conducted through the 





Key tasks of the National Cell were: 
 Review tracks 
 Answer scenario questions 
 Answer sharing decision surveys about the decision to share 
 Answer queries from team member on the Information Trading Cell  
 Determine what data can be released 
 Release data for sharing by Information Trading Cell      
Multinational Information Trading Cell 
The Multinational Information Trading Cell is where all information exchanges occurred 
during the game.  The Information Trading Cell was comprised of 12 members, one from each 
participating nation.  The sharing of data among the various countries was done by using the 
internal game tool, designed specifically for this game.  Traders were able communicate with 
their National Cells via Chat.  Communications between traders within the Trading Cell were 
done via person-to-person or e-mail. 
Key tasks of the Information Trading Cell were: 
 Request data from National Cell members 
 Share data with other cell members (via the Web Tool)                         
Home Operations Center 
In addition to the personnel who traveled to Newport, each participating nation had the 
opportunity to support this event through connectivity with existing policy, command or 
operations centers. Connectivity between the National Cell and its home-based organizations was 
accomplished through email, telephone or chat. To this end, internet connectivity was provided 
in each game cell and a telephone center was established for the use of the players.  
Cell Connectivity 
 The National Cells were connected to their representative on the Trading Cell and to 
personnel and information sources at home.  Communications between members of the National 
Cell and their representative on the Trading cell were by via a chat function on the game’s Web 
Tool.  The track database will be available to the National Cells and the Trading Cell on the Web 
Tool.    
 Each National Cell had three computer workstations in their game room.  Two were used 
for the game Web Tool (one for chat, the other for the track database) and the third terminal was 
used for InRelief.org connectivity and internet access.  National Cell members were able to 





 Each member of the Trading Cell had a single computer workstation that allowed him to 
view the track database and communicate with his National Cell via chat.  The Figure below 
depicts the Communications pathways within the Game Cells.  
During the game, one additional communications path was added. Because some cells did not 
have a full complement of players, it was decided to permit the trading cell representative to 
consult with the national cell and support deliberations on information releasability for 15 
















 The foundation of the game is the Web Tool track database.  The Naval War College 
created a dedicated Web Tool specifically for use in the MDA Operational Game.  Participants 
were provided role-based log-ins and passwords to access the tool.  Participants received training 
on the Web Tool during Move 0 prior to the actual start of the Information-Sharing Game. The 
complete database includes more than 900 individual tracks.  Each national team received 
approximately twenty tracks at the beginning of each of the game’s three moves.  Each country’s 
vessel tracks were distinct from each other and within each move. During the course of each 
move, as teams shared track data, the number of tracks viewable by each team increased. 
 The database consisted of fictitious track information for various vessels, including 
merchant ships, government vessels, fishing vessels, and pleasure vessels.  The database has the 
following fields: 
 Vessel Name 
 Flag 





 Ship Type (cargo/tanker/fishing/sailing/etc.) 
 Dimension (draft/length/width/tonnage) 
 Status (underway/in port) 
 Last Port of Call 
 Next Port of Call 
 Location (South China Sea/Western Indian Ocean/etc.) 
 Master’s Nationality 
 Owner’s Nationality 
 Amplifying Information 
                                                          
 With the exception of the information-sharing model in use, each of the three game 
moves was structured identically in terms of the four distinct steps, and player tasks that each 
cell was required to complete. 
Task 1:  Review track data and decide whether information is releasable to other cells 
 The key task for this game is for each player cell to evaluate the information they receive 
at the start of the move and determine whether and to what extent that information can be shared 
with other cells.  Initially, the players must examine the information that they have been given in 
order to fully understand the nature of the report and any associated scenarios. They will then 
need to identify if the vessel and scenario information is affected by some factor that makes the 
information unshareable. For example, some players may be unable to share crew lists because 
of privacy law in their country. After the players have determined if their national laws and 
policies permit them to share a given piece of information, they must similarly determine if any 
player cell should be excluded from receiving the information. All player cells were expected to 
use their real world policies to do this with the exception that in the global and coalition models, 
the player cells were placed into sharing constructs which do not exist in reality. In these 
situations, the players were to treat the other player cells as they would a country with which 
they do have a similarly constructed sharing agreement in reality. Finally, players needed to 
determine if the sharing rules would permit them to share information in ways that did not 
violate their national policies. For example, if their policies permitted them to share with another 
specific country, but also specified that a second country must be excluded, then in the global 
and coalition models, the players needed to decide if they could share in order to provide the first 
country with the information, or if they needed to withhold the information in order to prevent 
the second country from receiving it.  
 It is important here to note that the players were not provided with any information 
regarding the sources and methods used to obtain the information or regarding classification or 
sensitivity. The players were asked to review the information and use their experience to 
determine how the information would have been obtained or would be handled in their country 
or organization. Again, the game design deliberately avoided requesting that the players provide 
information about this assessment because of the belief that players would negatively react to 
being asked to discuss such sensitive issues in an unclassified, international forum. Instead, the 
players asked to use that internally generated and private assessment guide their decisions with 





information is shared only in certain situations or to certain partners, then their activities in the 
game should mirror those situations.   
As player cells made the determination whether they could share information associated 
with a given vessel, they were asked to answer a brief survey about their decision. The structure 
of this survey is further discussed in Section IV-B of the report.   
Task 2:  Answer Scenario Questions 
 As teams reviewed their track data, they searched for answers to a list of scenario 
questions that were provided at the beginning of the move. The answers to these questions could 
only be found by receiving data from other cells. A typical scenario question might be: Is M/V 
Explorer associated with any illicit activity? If so, what? 
Task 3:  Request Information 
 Player cells had several mechanisms to request the answers to their scenario questions 
from other player cells. The first means was to send the request via chat to their representative in 
the trading cell who was then able to discuss the request face to face or via chat with the trading 
representatives from all other cells. Second, the player cell could enter the request into a site on 
the InRelief.org website where the information request would be visible to all other players.  
Task 4:  Share Information 
 After a player cell determined that a given piece of information could be shared with 
other cells and released it to the trading cell representative, that information could be shared 
through the Web Tool. Sharing in this game is a two step process with the trading cell 
representative holding the final authority to share any information. This allowed the cell and the 





Appendix D: Data Collection and Analysis Plan  
I. Introduction  
 One of the most important functions of war gaming is to answer timely research questions 
posed by our sponsors. In order to do so, effective data capture germane to the research area of 
interest is critical. Successful data capture enables useful analysis, ensuring a symbiotic relationship 
between game design and subsequent findings. To ensure that data collection methods and analytic 
techniques are relevant to the game objectives for the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) 
Operational Game, the following Data Collection and Analysis Plan (DCAP) is provided in this 
document.  
II. Game Purpose  
 The purpose of the unclassified MDA Operational Game is to enhance Maritime Domain 
Awareness through the sharing of information with international partners in order to inform the 
Global Maritime  Partnership Game (October 2010), which in turn supports International Sea Power 
Symposium (ISS) XX. Specifically, this game examines the impediments and best practices to 
effective information sharing within regional and global MDA related relationships and networks, as 
well as identifies options for broad based international maritime information sharing.  
 In the United States, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is defined by National Security 
Presidential Directive 41 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD41/HSPC13), 
Maritime Security Policy, “as the effective understanding of anything associated with the global 
maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy or environment of the United 
States.” Several nations have also undertaken MDA programs under various names, including, but 
not limited to Maritime Domain Awareness, Maritime Situation Awareness and Maritime 
Awareness. Effective MDA requires international collaboration that supports the maritime awareness 
requirements of each participant. Therefore, many uses of the terms "MDA," "Maritime Domain 
Awareness," or "Maritime Awareness" do not refer specifically to the United States, but rather: "The 
effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime environment that could 
impact safety, security, the economy and the environment."  
 The objectives explored in this game are consistent with the U.S. Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO), Admiral Roughead’s statement during the International Sea Power Symposium 19, in which 
he stated that an international game would be held at the Naval War College to explore the 
operational implications of MDA. The MDA Operational Game will serve as preliminary research 
for the Global Maritime Partnership Game scheduled for October 2010. Furthermore, Admiral 
Roughhead asserted that:  
“Maritime security supports the free flow of commerce for all nations. Maritime Domain 
Awareness is knowing what is moving below, on, and above the sea. Without a high level of 
Maritime Domain Awareness the free flow of commerce is jeopardized. The goal of 
Maritime Domain Awareness is to establish a level of security regarding vessels approaching 







III. Overarching Research Question and Hypotheses  
 In order to better understand the type of information that is shared across the various 
international information sharing structures, the MDA Operational game seeks to deductively answer 
the following research question:  “Based on the information sharing models that will be employed in 
this game, what is the preferred structure for international information sharing that provides each 
entity with the most volume and detail of maritime information?” In this game, volume is defined as 
the amount or quantity of data shared and is measured by the percentage of information shared 
throughout the game. Detail is defined as the specificity of information that is embedded in the 
scenario track. Accordingly, this information is measured by four tiers of information sensitivity. As 
the numbered tiers increase, the amount of detailed information associated with that track also 
increases. For example, Tier 1 consists of the basic AIS Shipping Data (i.e., ships position, flag, 
owner, etc.) whereas Tier 4 provides all of the known information provided in Tier 1 through 3 plus 
detailed information on the ship’s crew, cargo and history.  
 In order to understand the best practices and impediments to effective international 
information sharing, this game seeks to inductively answer the following research question: “To what 
extent do interagency challenges within a country impact the ability to share information with other 
countries?”  
 At a more structural-level, the MDA Operational game examines four specific hypotheses 
(H1-H4) and a null hypothesis (H0) on the subject of international maritime information sharing. 
These hypotheses were crafted after reviewing scholarly literature in the area of Maritime Domain 
Awareness, and examining existing international maritime information structures. The hypotheses 
studied in this game are framed globally, not from a U.S. perspective, whereas each of the country 
cells is represented by Blue against a notional, one-sided red embedded scenario. The hypotheses are 
as follows:  
H1: – In the Global unrestricted information sharing model, players will share a high volume of 
information with low detail.  
H2: – The Coalition Model will enable players to share a high volume with more detail.  
H3: - In the Bilateral Model, players will share the lowest volume of information, but the information 
that they do share will be the most detailed.  
H4: – The structure of information sharing that provides the most volume and detail will be a 
combination of one or more models.  
H0: – Null: There is no relationship between the information sharing models employed and the 
volume and detail of information that is shared among maritime partners.  
IV. Game Design as a Catalyst for Effective Post-Game Analysis  
 This game is designed to enhance players’ understanding of the impediments to effective 
information sharing and regional MDA related relationships and networks, as well as identify options 
for broad based international maritime information sharing in order to raise awareness and increase 





 To foster this environment, the game has been organized into two phases. Phase One of the 
game will take place during the first two days. Each country will provide a briefing focused on 
maritime information sharing in their respective country. The main topics that will be covered in the 
player briefing are: a) descriptions of internal (national) and external (regional and global) MDA 
information sharing efforts; b) descriptions of MDA successes, challenges, and best practices; and, c) 
each country’s expectations for the game.  
 Phase two consists of a one-sided game, in which each country cell evaluates the information 
that is provided and determines-- based upon their respective laws, polices and information sharing 
agreements--whether and to what extent, that information can be shared with other countries. Each 
team will consist of two Navy members, one Foreign Service representative and one other MDA 
provider. Three members of the country cell will work together in a cell independently from the other 
countries. The fourth member of each country cell will represent its team in a separate cell, known as 
the “trading cell” where the sharing of information from country to country will actually occur.  
 The country teams will be presented with a set of fictitious maritime data. In the real world, 
this information will have come from a variety of sources, such as domestic agencies or intelligence 
services, regional networks, open source information, or Automated Identification System reports. 
However, due to the sensitivity of sources and methods, the source from which these data were 
collected from, will not be provided during the game. At the beginning of each game, each country 
will be provided a set of vessel related questions that they will need to answer. These questions can 
only be answered by receiving the necessary information from members of the other cells. The 
scenario questions are designed to stimulate game play and serve as the victory conditions for the 
players. Each cell will be measured by the amount of scenario questions it was able to answer 
correctly. During game play, scores of each country will be displayed on the screen without 
attribution to a particular country. Three serial games (moves) will be conducted over the course of 
two days. Each move will utilize a different information sharing model, as follows:  
A. MOVE ONE: The GLOBAL MODEL allows for the exchange of maritime information between 
countries by use of a central unrestricted access data repository. Once the information is in the central 
data repository, everyone can see it--there are no, or extremely low, barriers to membership in this 
sharing group.  
B. MOVE TWO: The COALITION MODEL allows for the exchange of MDA information between 
countries by use of a central restricted access data repository. Only those countries that belong to the 
“coalition” are granted access to the data. For the purpose of this game, all of the countries 
participating are, by default, members of this fictional coalition. During this game “Move” there are 
no “bilateral” sharing relationships allowed and there is no “Global” unrestricted access central data 
repository.  
C. MOVE THREE: The BILATERAL MODEL will be used in the last move and allows for the 
exchange of information between two countries only. There is no central data repository; the 
information is stored exclusively for those two countries.  
 





 The independent (or x) variable in this game is the type of information sharing model 
employed while the dependent (or y) variable is the volume and detail of information that is shared 
among the players. Essentially, Phase One (i.e., player briefings) of the event is designed to capture 
each country’s successes, solutions and challenges to information sharing (such as political, legal, 
and cultural) in order to educate each of the partner nations. Phase Two, Game Play, will examine the 
volume and detail of information shared among the participants when applied to different 
information sharing models and identify the major impediments to international information sharing.  
VI. Game Play: Country Cell Deliverables  
 During Phase One of the game, each country will provide a briefing focused on maritime 
information sharing in their respective country. At the end of each briefing there will be 
approximately 15 minutes available for broader discussions among the participants. Subsequently, 
there will be two open plenary sessions held at the conclusion of day one and two, respectively. 
During both of these periods, environmental recorders will be employed in order to capture the 
insights derived from group discussions. Responses to these questions will be captured via an 
unclassified laptop, and routed to the DCAT for analysis.  
 During game play, each player cell will develop the following core products:  
 Release of information track by the country cell to the country lead inside of the “trading 
cell” (submitted via MDA Information Database and captured via UNCLAS GAMENET).  
 Release of information track by the country lead to the other players inside of the “trading 
cell” (submitted via MDA Information Database and captured via UNCLAS GAMENET).  
 Electronic Communiqués between players inside of the “trading cell” for information 
(submitted via Microsoft Outlook and captured via UNCLAS GAMENET).  
 Before the country cell releases information to their country representative located in the 
“trading cell”, a set of sharing decision survey questions will be displayed, requiring a 
response. Specifically, these questions are designed to capture the impediments to sharing 
and the player’s decision-making process associated with that specific track. The DCAT and 
cell facilitators will look across each country’s database to identify common themes and 
issues that would feed directly into the post game group plenary. Throughout game play, 
before releasing the information, players will be prompted to the following “Sharing decision 
survey” questions:  
For the information you have chosen not to share in this track, why have you decided not to share 
it? (check all that apply)  
o Legal  
o Policy  
o Political  
o Economic  
o Cultural  
o Sensitivity of Information  
o Other: _____________________________  





Information in this track would regularly be: (check all that apply)  
o shared within the organizations represented in my cell.  
o released to other organizations in my country.  
o released to other countries.  
o received from other countries.  
o of High Medium or Low interest to my country.  
For the categories selected, please elaborate: _____________________  
 In addition to these deliverables, each of the country player cells will have the opportunity to 
provide direct, functionally-oriented insights into the broader aspects of international information 
sharing. Specifically, information sharing surveys will be administered up to three times (i.e., at the 
end of each move) during the game. This survey is designed to capture the thoughts and opinions of 
the players allowing for open-ended responses to the following questions:  
As you read through each question, think about your county’s current information agreements, 
the structure of the information sharing model used in this move, and those impediments which 
influenced or restricted your cells ability or willingness to share information.  
9. What were the major factors that restricted your country cell’s ability to share information during 
this move? Of these, what were the most common?  
10. What were the major legal impediments that influenced or restricted your country cell’s ability or 
willingness to share information during this move?  
11. What were the major policy impediments that influenced or restricted your country cell’s ability 
or willingness to share information during this move?  
12. What were the major cultural impediments that influenced or restricted your cell’s ability or 
willingness to share information during this move?  
13. During this move, what information was your cell unwilling to share with other countries?  
a) Why were you unwilling to share this information?  
14. What were the major things that influenced your country cell’s willingness to share information 
during this move? Of these, what were the most common?  
15. During this move, what information was your country cell unable to share with other countries?  
a) Why were you unable to share this information?  
16. What information did your country cell share during this move that you normally would not share 
with other countries? Please explain why you shared it.  





 Table 1 also provides the eight Likert-scale questions asked of each country cell’s players as 








+2 Agree  +3 Strongly 
Agree  
1. The total amount of 
tracks my country cell 
received from other countries 
during this move influenced 
my cell’s decision making.  
-3 Strongly 
Disagree  




+2 Agree  +3 Strongly 
Agree  
2. The level of detail my 
country cell received from 
other countries during this 
move influenced my cell’s 
decision making.  
-3 Strongly 
Disagree  




+2 Agree  +3 Strongly 
Agree  
3. During this move, my 
country cell made decisions 
that were contrary to existing 
domestic information sharing 
policies or agreements.  
-3 Strongly 
Disagree  




+2 Agree  +3 Strongly 
Agree  
4. During this move, my 
country cell made decisions 
regarding situations which 
are not covered or governed 








+2 Agree  +3 Strongly 
Agree  
5. Based on the decisions my 
country cell made in this 
move, existing domestic 
policies and agreements need 
further examination.  
-3 Strongly 
Disagree  




+2 Agree  +3 Strongly 
Agree  
6. The information made 
available to my country cell 
during this move would help 
support my country’s 






Appendix E: Analysis of Idea Sharing Phase 
I. Player Briefings & Plenary Discussions Results and Observations 
a. Common definitions: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) was a commonly 
accepted and understood term used by many of the participating nations. Over 
90% of the participating nations defined MDA as the effective understanding of 
anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, 
safety, economy, or environment of a nation.  Over 50% of the players noted that 
MDA also provides a platform from which countries can establish bilateral and 
cooperative agreements. However, the United Kingdom described Maritime 
Security Awareness (MSA) as a law enforcement function, rather than a military 
function, which in turn is a key enabler to conducting MDA.   
b. Participation in Information Sharing: All of the participating nations are presently 
members of a regional coalition. Over 90% of these are connected by means of a 
secure network. Of the countries that currently do not participate in a formal 
regional coalition network, players noted geopolitical impediments to forming 
such coalitions among neighboring countries. There was player consensus that the 
lack of a formalized internal/interagency MDA information sharing structure 
makes the sharing of information internally cumbersome and often inadequate to 
support objectives. 
i. All of the players described the following issues as important to maritime 
awareness: safety and security, commerce and trade, sustainment and 
preservation of natural resources, managing and controlling of illegal 
migration, the detection and deterrence of illegal trafficking of humans, 
drugs and proliferation, pollution prevention, counter-piracy and search 
and rescue.   
ii. Players identified the following national maritime information objectives: 
strengthen alliances, promote an interagency approach to MDA, ensure 
maritime surveillance systems are integrated, provide peace and stability 
within the region, early warning of anomalous activities and provide 
efficient and safe maritime travel.  
iii. The following domestic organizations were listed by players as direct 
contributors to MDA: Coast Guard, Police, Customs, Fishery 
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, Transport Agency, 
Civil Contingencies Agency, Weather services, Armed Forces.  The use of 
a steering committee which provides guidelines for information 
management was also noted as a contributor to successful MDA. 
iv. Successful MDA was defined by all participating national delegations as 
ability to reduce the number of illicit activities and to save lives.  Every 
nation that belongs to a regional information sharing coalition described a 
significant improvement to its own MDA as a result of information 
sharing among its partners.   
v. The establishment of trust and communication were cited as the greatest 
challenges to MDA information sharing.   Players noted that establishing a 
global initiative to create an integrated maritime information sharing 





countries noted that pushing past organizational cultural impediments and 
integration of legacy systems and technologies has been a significant 
internal challenge.   
vi. Players achieved consensus that information sharing is initiated for two 
pragmatic reasons: first, to receive information through reciprocal sharing 
and, second, to improve the capacity of sharing partners to take actions 
which support one’s own national objectives (e.g., to interrupt in their own 
territory smuggling operations which affect both countries). By receiving 
shared information a nation improves its own maritime awareness which 
in turn supports national defense, law enforcement and other national 
interests.  When sharing is employed in a functional or regional coalition, 
it also provides for efficient use of resources in achieving coalition 
objectives. The group agreed that no single country has the means and 
resources required to monitor the vast amount of traffic that transit global 
waters.   
vii. Over 75% of the national briefings described information sharing as a 
means to providing increasing maritime security and situational awareness 
in order to deter terrorist and criminal organizations from exploiting 
international and interagency loopholes conducting illicit activities.  
Nations also discussed trans-regional maritime information sharing as a 





Appendix F: Analysis of Game Moves 
A. Summary and Analysis of Game Moves 
In summary, the post-game analysis supported hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, and partially 
rejected Hypothesis 3. Global sharing occurred at a high volume for Tier 1 information while 
sharing under the Coalition model was at a high volume for all tiers. The detail of information 
shared increased when moving from a Global unrestricted information-sharing model to a 
Coalition model. The volume of sharing in the Bilateral model was indeed the lowest of all 
models, but, contrary to the premise of Hypothesis 3, the shared detail was less than that of the 
Coalition model.   
In each move of the game, each country controlled the data for at least one track of each 
scenario type (Listed in Appendix B). The results of this detailed analysis of participant actions 
at the scenario type level confirm previous conclusions. On a per country basis, players shared 
the most track data (volume and detail), in the Coalition model, the least amount of data in the 
Global model, and the Bilateral model resulted in sharing levels that fell in between the two. 
There are two noteworthy items contained in these detailed result panels. 
First, during the plenary sessions, several participants noted that they would be unwilling 
to share track data on their own state military vessels in a Global unrestricted information-
sharing network, but would be more willing to share this data in a Coalition information-sharing 
network. Further, in a Bilateral information-sharing network, players noted that this data would 
only be shared when requested (“pulled”). Collected data supports these comments. Track data 
on own-state military vessels was shared 31% of the time in the Global model, 71% of the time 
in the Coalition model, and 37% of the time in the Bilateral model. Similar patterns exist across 
most of the sensitive track fields (amplifying information, crew specifics, etc.). 
Second, the most critical track type identification classes were considered to be 
traffickers and WMD proliferators. Surprisingly the same pattern exists for sharing of track 
information on these critical contacts of interest. The volume and detail of data shared peaked in 
the Coalition model where data was shared on virtually 100% of these contacts compared to 
approximately 35% in the Global unrestricted model and 75% in the Bilateral model. A similar, 
but less extreme pattern is observed in the “common good” track types (piracy victims, HADR 
vessels, and health contagion risks). It was hypothesized that information on these critical 
contacts would be shared most freely in the Bilateral model and this did not prove to be the case. 
(See Appendix for detailed panel data).    
Throughout the game, owner, owner nationality, and master nationality were not shared 
as highly as other Tier 1 information. Players stated that this was due to legal and policy 
restrictions on sharing privacy-related and commercial information. This created a subset of Tier 
1 information that was not shared as extensively.   
 During the game each trader was asked to answer a sharing decision survey after every 
track was considered for sharing. The analysis of player actions and post-move survey data shed 





questions attempt to ascertain specific motivations for sharing (not sharing) associated with 
individual tracks. 
 After national cell had completed a sharing transaction, they were asked: “For the 
information you have chosen not to share on this track, why have you decided not to share it? 
(Check all that apply.)” The response options were: legal, policy, political, economic, cultural, 
sensitivity of information, other, and I decided to share everything. The results of this survey 
question are presented below:  
 
 These results indicate that, in general, players’ motivation for not sharing data on a 
particular track was fairly consistent across all three moves. There are two notable exceptions to 
this trend that relate directly to the game hypotheses. First, the amount of information that was 
not shared due to policy concerns was dramatically higher within the Bilateral information-
sharing model framework than it was for either the Global or Coalition information-sharing 
model frameworks. To control for the possible bias in the data, we aggregated the legal and 






 The second significant observation from the trends of responses to sharing decision 
survey Question 1 is related to the sensitivity of information responses. The supposition under 
hypothesis 3 is that the Bilateral information-sharing model would create the environment that is 
most conducive to sharing detailed (sensitive) information. As predicted, sensitivity of 
information was less of a concern during the Move 2 Coalition information-sharing model. 
Unexpectedly, sensitivity of information was more of a concern during the Move 3 Bilateral 
information-sharing model framework than both the Coalition and Global unrestricted 
information sharing model frameworks. This result serves to correlate the interpretation of the 






 The second sharing decision survey question asked: “Information on this track would 
regularly be: (Check all that apply.)” The response options were: shared within the organizations 
represented in my cell, released to other organizations in my country, released to other countries, 
received from other countries, high interest to my country, medium interest to my country, and 
low interest to my country. The results of this survey question are presented below: 
 
Players discussed ways to work around impediments to sharing in a coalition model.  One 
technique offered was to provide as much detail as possible to help the partner react, but without 
compromising the source of the information.  Another player noted that the downside to this 
technique is that not knowing the source of the information made it more difficult to evaluate the 
value of the information shared.  Several players agreed that a new maritime domain awareness 
coalition would benefit from a review or change of individual member national policies with 
respect to sensitive information sharing. In this move, players were willing to share more, but 
still would not share information pertaining to military vessels and privacy concerns. 
In the Coalition Model the overall amount of information released and shared increased.  
Specifically, the most significant increase occurred in the sharing of the “Tier 4 information.” 
Another player suggested that the best way to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is to use all 
three models of information sharing:  the global model to share non-sensitive info; the coalition 
model for sharing within common interests; and the bi-lateral model to share more sensitive 
information. 
Move 1: Global Information Sharing Model 
The first move used the Global information sharing model.  Hypothesis 1 was supported 
with evidence from game play during Move 1. During this move, country teams were allowed to 
release and share various data related to a total of 264 tracks. The data fields of vessel of interest, 
general amplifying information, amplifying information on the crew, amplifying information on 





that would indicate willingness on the part of the player to share detailed information. Because 
not all tracks had data available for each of the data fields, the analysis focused on the percentage 
of available data fields that was released (shared) by the players. The results are presented below: 
 
More than 50% of the tracks that were available to be shared within the Global 
unrestricted information-sharing model were shared on the Global network. The figure above 
also shows that, as the level of sensitivity of the data increases, the players’ willingness to share 
that information decreases. The percentage of data shared for the five fields considered to be 
indicative of willingness to share detailed data (vessel of interest and amplifying information) is 
much lower than the total percentage of tracks shared for the less sensitive Tier 1 fields (in the 
range of 38-52% as opposed to 60-70%). The analysis of participant actions during Move 1 of 
the game supports the hypothesis that players will share a high volume of track data but share 
lower amounts of detailed data in the Global unrestricted information-sharing model framework.  





After the trader completed a transaction related to a track, sharing decision survey 
Question 1 asked: “For the information you have chosen not to share on this track, why have you 
decided not to share it? (Check all that apply.)” The response options were: legal, policy, 
political, economic, cultural, sensitivity of information, other, and I decided to share everything. 
The results of this survey question are presented below:    
 
 
 During Move 1, players indicated that legal and policy restrictions as well as the 
sensitivity of the information were the primary reasons for not sharing information in the Global 
information-sharing model. This further supports the hypothesis that more sensitive information 





During Move 1, sharing decision survey Question 2 asked: “Information on this track 
would regularly be: (Check all that apply.)” The response options were: shared within the 
organizations represented in my cell, released to other organizations in my country, released to 
other countries, received from other countries, high interest to my country, medium interest to 
my country, and low interest to my country. The results of this survey question are presented 
below:  
 
The survey question shown above demonstrates that players indicated that for information 
similar to that presented during Move 1, they have a high degree of intradepartmental and 
interagency sharing and that they receive similar information less often than they share it, 
indicating that they tend to rely more on domestic activities than international information 
sharing to meet their MDA requirements. Lastly, the results in this survey that show that the 
information in this move was of higher interest confirm that the information provided to the 
players during this move was relevant and reflective of reality. 
At the conclusion of each move, the players were asked to complete a survey explaining 
their actions during the move. The first eight questions were Likert scale questions that lend 
themselves to some degree of quantitative analysis and will be discussed in detail in the 
conclusion where move behavior is compared.  The remaining questions were open-ended and 
specific to the individual move. The analysis of the open-ended, qualitative questions involved 
examination in the survey responses as well as discussions that occurred during the post-move 
plenary sessions. Prior to being asked the survey questions, participants were given the following 
directions: “As you read through each question, think about your country’s current information 
agreements, the structure of the information sharing model used in this move, and those 
impediments which influenced or restricted your cell’s ability or willingness to share 
information.” 
The results for Move 1 survey questions 1-8 are aggregated with the results from moves 2 





Question 9 asked: “What were the major factors that restricted your country cell’s ability 
to share information during this move. Of these, what were the most common?” The concerns 
expressed during the post-move survey and plenary following Move 1 shared some common 
themes.  In determining criteria for releasing and sharing information, players cited sensitivity to 
criminal activity, ongoing investigations, and relationship of information to national security.  
Alternatively, if the information was needed for a humanitarian relief operation, participants 
were more willing to share more detailed and sensitive information. Among the impediments to 
sharing, the players acknowledged legal, policy, and cultural barriers to sharing.  Specifically, 
several players noted that they would not share information if it jeopardized a legal prosecution 
effort or investigation.  Also, they did not openly share cargo data or sensitive commercial 
shipping data for fear of giving a competitive advantage to other shipping companies.  
Question 10 asked: “What were the major legal impediments that influenced or restricted 
your country cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” Over one-third 
of the players responded “none” or indicated that they lacked sufficient legal experience to 
render an opinion. Of those who did answer, the sensitivity of the information due to 
classification and/or the protection of privacy related information were the two common 
impediments. Moreover, some of the respondents implied that once an investigation was initiated 
in their home country, the lead agency for the investigation then took responsibility for deciding 
(legally) what information could be legally released to whom.  
Question 11 asked: “What were the major policy impediments that influenced or 
restricted your country cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” The 
results from the post-move survey and plenary following Move 1 follows. While there were 
fewer “none” or other responses that indicated players lacked sufficient expertise to render 
opinions (than there were for the legal impediments question),  none of the participants exhibited 
a broad understanding of all of the policy impediments that restricted their ability to share 
information. Considering that most players represented the interests of their navies and/or coast 
guards, they seemed to limit their application of policy-based sharing impediments to those 
related to military vessels and privacy related information.  
Question 12 asked: “What were the major cultural impediments that influenced or 
restricted your cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” During the 
post-move survey and plenary following Move 1, the majority of the players responded “none” 
to this question. Those few who did answer cited the (lack of) trust necessary that the 
information shared would be properly protected.   
Question 13 asked: “During this move, what information was your cell unwilling to share 
with other countries? Why were you unwilling to share this information?” During the post-move 
survey and plenary following Move 1, players seemed reluctant to provide comprehensive 
answers.  Most of the players appeared to focus on what type of information that their country 
was unwilling to share. Some of the more common responses were: information that was 
generally classified, military vessel information, privacy sensitive information like crew lists, 





Question 14 asked: “What were the major factors that influenced your cell’s willingness 
to share information during this move?  Of these, what were the most common?” The most 
common response was that players were more willing to share information when they perceived 
it to be in support of the common good.   
Question 15 asked: “During this move, what information was your country cell unable to 
share with other countries? Why were you unable to share this information?” During the post-
move survey and plenary following Move 1, similar to Question 13, most of the players appeared 
to focus on only one type of information that their country was unable to share. Some of the 
more common responses were: information that was generally classified, military vessel 
information, privacy sensitive information like crew lists and economically sensitive information 
like cargo manifests.  Few cited the specific reason they were unable likely because they had just 
cited the reasons in the preceding questions.  
Question 16 asked: “What information did your country cell share during this move that 
you normally would not share with other countries?  Please explain why you shared this 
information.”  During the post-move survey and plenary following Move 1, there was consensus 
that the vast majority of players did not share information during the move if they felt as if they 
would be unable/unwilling to share it in the real world.  
Question 17 asked: “What issues during this move would be worthy of future study?”  
During the post-move survey and plenary following Move 1, there was no consensus.  Given the 
wide disparity in experience levels and expertise at this game, it is no surprise that many 
different issues were highlighted as worthy of future study. No central theme was identifiable. 
Protecting the source, limiting distribution away from potential hostile entities and capacity 






Move 2: Coalition Information Sharing Model 
The second move employed the Coalition information sharing model. Hypothesis 2 is 
supported with evidence from game play during Move 2 and Move 1. During this move, country 
teams were allowed to release and share various data related to a total of 260 tracks. The sharing 
results from move 2 are below: 
 
 
 The differences between percentages of tracks released (shared) during Move 2 compared 






The figure above shows that players shared a higher percentage of track information 
(higher volume) for every possible data field in the Coalition information-sharing framework 
than they shared in the Global unrestricted information-sharing framework. Additionally, the 
percent of increases in the amount of data shared for the five sensitive data fields (Tiers 2-4) is 
dramatically more pronounced than the increase in data shared for the less sensitive AIS-type 
(Tier 1) data. These results tend to support the hypothesis that players will share a high volume 
with more detail in a Coalition information-sharing model when compared to the Global 
unrestricted information-sharing model. 
Sharing decision survey Question 1 asked: “For the information you have chosen not to 
share on this track, why have you decided not to share it? (Check all that apply.)” The response 
options were: legal, policy, political, economic, cultural, sensitivity of information, other, and I 






 During Move 2, players indicated that legal and policy restrictions as well as the 
sensitivity of the information were the still reasons for not sharing information in the Coalition 
information-sharing model, but the proportion of “I decided to share everything” responses 
increased. 
Sharing decision survey Question 2 asked: “Information on this track would regularly be: 
(Check all that apply.)” The response options were: shared within the organizations represented 
in my cell, released to other organizations in my country, released to other countries, received 
from other countries, high interest to my country, medium interest to my country, and low 






The survey results shown above are consistent with those for Move 1.  
Prior to being asked the survey questions, participants were given the following 
directions: “As you read through each question, think about your country’s current information 
agreements, the structure of the information sharing model used in this move, and those 
impediments which influenced or restricted your cell’s ability or willingness to share 
information.” 
The results for Move 2 survey questions 1-8 are aggregated with the results from Moves 
1 and 3 and are found in the appendices. 
Question 9 asked: “What were the major factors that restricted your country cell’s ability 
to share information during this move. Of these, what were the most common?”  Following 
Move 2, the players indicated that they released more info, and were willing to share a greater 
percentage of information released as a result of security in coalition and better gamesmanship.  
Several players agreed that the coalition model of sharing was easier to use because they already 
had a common framework and common interests from which to evaluate their decisions to share 
information. Additionally, there was a sense among the players that they were willing to share 
information more readily in a coalition model even when their own policies were not clear or 
known because of the existence of a game-specific legal structure. Another 25 percent of the 
players said that they shared information in Move 2 even though it went against the policies of 
their respective governments.  Players assumed more trust in their coalition partners and pushed 
more information and with greater detail.  Players also responded that they increased sharing of 
sensitive information but still withheld military or law enforcement information in most cases.  
One player noted that the existence of the game-specific coalition was critical to opening the 
door to sharing. During this move, players noted types of information that would likely limit 
sharing. These were: military and law-enforcement related vessels and reports, information that 
could embarrass friendly nations that were not necessarily part of the coalition, and the last and 
next ports of call for any specific vessel. One player noted that better gamesmanship led them to 
push all information except for military and sensitive information.   
Question 10 asked: “What were the major legal impediments that influenced or restricted 
your country cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” Following 
Move 2, similar to Move 1, over one third of the players cited no major legal impediments that 
influenced their ability or willingness to share information in a Coalition information-sharing 
model framework.  Of those players who commented, over half cited “privacy” issues over 
personnel, both crew and passengers, and cargo as the major legal impediments to sharing 
information.  Several players noted that “legal and law enforcement actions” were legal 
impediments as well.  One player noted that they felt that there were fewer impediments to 
sharing in the coalition model.  
Question 11 asked: “What were the major policy impediments that influenced or 
restricted your country cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” The 
three major policy impediments identified in Move 2 were National Security Policy over military 





protect intelligence sources.  One player also cited the need to respect host nation policy for a 
vessel in a foreign port.  
Question 12 asked: “What were the major cultural impediments that influenced or 
restricted your cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” Following 
Move 2, most players again noted that no cultural impediments to information sharing.  The only 
caveat was that one player cited information that was potentially showing insensitivity to 
neighboring countries as being a cultural impediment to sharing information in the coalition 
model.  
Question 13 asked: “During this move, what information was your cell unwilling to share 
with other countries? Why were you unwilling to share this information?”  Following Move 2, 
the majority of players cited at least some reason for their unwillingness to share with other 
countries.  Similar to Move 1, many players cited types of information that they did not share 
such as military vessel information, personnel and crew manifest privacy information, and 
ongoing law enforcement activities and/or investigations.  Several specific responses included 
not sharing information about a submarine in order to protect an intelligence source and a 
merchant ship operating in the EEZ, even though that was considered to be international water.   
Question 14 asked: “What were the major factors that influenced your cell’s willingness 
to share information during this move?  Of these, what were the most common?” Following 
Move 2, players cited several common factors that influenced their willingness to share 
information in the coalition model.  Being a part of the coalition was cited by a third of the 
players, and they amplified their comments by emphasizing the increased cooperation and trust 
that a formal agreement and associated framework engendered.  In addition to identifying the 
usefulness of having common objectives, some players said that they also viewed safety as a 
common goal to coalition and non-coalition players.  Most were willing to share information 
based upon this “common good” justification.  Of note, one player also noted that the UN–
convention represented a larger coalition and reason to share safety related information.  
Question 15 asked: “During this move, what information was your country cell unable to 
share with other countries? Why were you unable to share this information?” Following Move 2, 
one quarter of the players responded that there was no information that they could not share in 
Move 2.  The players who identified information that they were unable to share cited the 
common reasons military and privacy sensitivities, similar to their responses in Question 13.  A 
possible skew in the data with this question may be related to the fact that some players did not 
seem to understand the difference between “unwilling to share” and “unable to share” as asked in 
Question 13 and Question 15 of the survey.  
Question 16 asked: “What information did your country cell share during this move that 
you normally would not share with other countries?  Please explain why you shared this 
information.”  Following Move 2, less than half of the players said there was no information 
shared that they normally would not share.  Players who came from nations with an existing 
regional MDA sharing network emphasized that they routinely shared the types of information 
available during this move through those networks, thereby confirming that the scenario 





objectives adequately.  Several players commented that they shared or amplified more sensitive 
data such as vessel locations, terrorist information, and illicit activities because they were in a 
coalition.  
Question 17 asked: “What issues during this move would be worthy of future study?”  As 
with the Move 1 post-move survey and plenary, there was no consensus.   
Move 3: Bilateral Information Sharing Model 
The last move in the game used the Bilateral information sharing model.  In this 
structure, information was only exchanged bi-laterally. The sharing results from this move are 
displayed below:  
 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported with evidence from game play during Move 3 compared to 
results from Move 1 and Move 2. During this move, country teams were allowed to release and 
share various data related to a total of 263 tracks. The differences between percentages of tracks 
released (shared) during Move 3 compared to percentages released (shared) in Move 1 are 






Players shared a higher percentage of track data on a per country basis within the 
Bilateral information sharing model framework than they did within the Global unrestricted 
information-sharing model framework. However, when the number of recipients is factored in, 
the overall volume is significantly lower, supporting the first element of H3.  
The differences between percentages of tracks released (shared) during Move 3 compared 






Players shared an equal or lower percentage of detailed track data within the Bilateral 
information-sharing model framework than they did within the Coalition information-sharing 
model framework for all track fields accept one (vessel of interest). This result would refute the 
second contention of H3 that supposes that players will share the highest amount of detailed 
information in the Bilateral information sharing model. 
The following points examine the two Sharing Decision Survey questions the player’s 
responded to during this move. Sharing decision survey Question 1 asked: “For the information 
you have chosen not to share on this track, why have you decided not to share it? (Check all that 
apply.)” The response options were: legal, policy, political, economic, cultural, sensitivity of 
information, other, and I decided to share everything. The results of this survey question are 
presented below:  
 
During Move 3, players indicated that legal and policy restrictions as well as the sensitivity of 
the information were the still reasons for not sharing information in the Bilateral information-
sharing model, but the proportion of “I decided to share everything” responses increased. 
Sharing decision survey Question 2 asked: “Information on this track would regularly be: 
(Check all that apply.)” The response options were: shared within the organizations represented 
in my cell, released to other organizations in my country, released to other countries, received 
from other countries, high interest to my country, medium interest to my country, and low 






The results for Move 3 post-move survey questions 1-8 are aggregated with the results 
from moves 1 and 2 and are found in the appendices. 
Prior to being asked the survey questions, participants were given the following 
directions: “As you read through each question, think about your country’s current information 
agreements, the structure of the information sharing model used in this move, and those 
impediments which influenced or restricted your cell’s ability or willingness to share 
information.” 
Question 9 asked: “What were the major factors that restricted your country cell’s ability 
to share information during this move. Of these, what were the most common?”  Following 
Move 3, many players commented that because each and every bilateral relationship is different, 
is was hard to make generalizations. But, most agreed that when a bilateral relationship was 
formed on the foundation of shared objectives with privacy and trust, the most sensitive 
information could/would be shared. Some players commented on the shift from a “push” to a 
“pull” strategy. Some believed this was in some ways attributable to game design and that it 
might not in all cases reflect reality.  The incentive to win the game encouraged players to not 
“push” information and adopt a “if they ask”….and if we’ve either got an existing bilateral 
relationship…. or if the forming of a bilateral relationship would not violate any of our laws or 
policies, “we’ll give” mentality.   
Question 10 asked: “What were the major legal impediments that influenced or restricted 
your country cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” Following 
Move 3, as with Moves 1 and 2, over one third of the players cited no major legal impediments 
that influenced their ability or willingness to share information during Move 3.  It is unclear, 
however, if this answer resulted from an extensive understanding and analysis of their legal 
environment or if they just didn’t have enough of a legal background to render an informed 
opinion.  Of those players who commented, over half cited “privacy” issues over crew, 
passengers, and cargo as the major legal impediments to sharing information.  Several players 





that there were fewer impediments to share in the bilateral model and another noted what he 
believed to be a lack of understanding - by other participants - on the boundaries of the bilateral 
agreements that had been established. Two players cited NATO rules as legal impediments 
influencing or restricting their ability to share information and two other players cited lack of 
confidentiality agreements as legal impediments, indicating they may not have understood that 
the Bilateral information sharing model was designed to provide players with the flexibility to 
establish –for the purposes of the game- confidentiality agreements as long as they were in 
accordance with their own laws and policies.  
Question 11 asked: “What were the major policy impediments that influenced or 
restricted your country cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” 
During Move 3, slightly more than one third of the players cited no major policy impediments to 
sharing under the bilateral information sharing model.  Of those who identified policy 
impediments, restrictive policies on the sharing of information on military vessels were the most 
common. Other policy impediments included NATO policies and a lack of Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) again indicating they may not have understood that the Bilateral 
information sharing model was designed to provide players with the flexibility to establish (for 
the purposes of the game) MOU’s as long as they were in accordance with their own laws and 
policies.  
Question 12 asked: “What were the major cultural impediments that influenced or 
restricted your cell’s ability or willingness to share information during this move?” As in Moves 
1 and 2, most players noted no cultural impediments to information sharing.  The exception 
being one player who cited the potential for showing insensitivity to neighboring countries as 
being a cultural impediment to sharing information.   
Question 13 asked: “During this move, what information was your cell unwilling to share 
with other countries? Why were you unwilling to share this information?”  Similar to Move 1 
and Move 2, many players noted that they were specifically unwilling to share military vessel 
information and, in some cases, provided amplifying details to specify the types of military 
information they were unwilling to share  (i.e., own country military, other nations military, 
naval vessels not on international deployments, etc.). Other players identified cargo information, 
personnel and crew manifests, other privacy information and ongoing law enforcement activities 
and/ or investigations as examples of information they were unwilling to share. Very few 
provided the reason behind their lack of willingness to share although those who did often cited 
sensitivity and classification. 
Question 14 asked: “What were the major factors that influenced your cell’s willingness 
to share information during this move?  Of these, what were the most common?” As opposed to 
Moves 1 and 2, where the players cited several common factors that influenced their willingness 
to share information, in the Bilateral model, the factors were wide and varied with no perceptible 
common theme.  Examples of factors listed included: winning the game, trying to share as 
widely as possible, the principle of reciprocity, quid pro quo, and need to know. 
 Question 15 asked: “During this move, what information was your country cell unable to 





and Move 2, many players noted that they were specifically unable to share military vessel 
information and in some cases provided amplifying details to specify the types of military 
information they were unable to share (i.e., own country military, other nations military, naval 
vessels not on international deployments etc.). Other players identified cargo information, 
personnel and crew manifests, other privacy information and ongoing law enforcement activities 
and/ or investigations as examples of information they were unable to share. Very few provided 
the reason behind their inability to share although those who did often cited sensitivity and 
classification. This may indicate once again that they may not have understood the Bilateral 
information sharing model was designed to provide players with the flexibility to establish –for 
the purposes of the game- confidentiality agreements with mutually agreed upon protocols that 
allowed for the sharing of sensitive information as long as they were in accordance with their 
own laws and policies.  
Question 16 asked: “What information did your country cell share during this move that 
you normally would not share with other countries?  Please explain why you shared this 
information.”  Two thirds of the players responded “none.” Of those who provided examples of 
information they shared during the game that they would not normally share, military vessel 
information and sensitive criminal information were the two most often cited.  
Question 17 asked: “What issues during this move would be worthy of future study?”  As 
with the post-move surveys and plenary sessions for Move 1 and 2, there was no consensus. 
Move 1-3 Aggregated Post-Move Survey Results, Questions 1-8:  
 At the end of each move, each participant was required to complete a survey consisting of 
eight questions. The analysis of these surveys tends to support the conclusions drawn from the 
analysis of participant actions during each of the game moves. The first six survey questions 
were on a six-point Likert scale (ranging from 6-Strongly Agree to 1-Strongly Disagree). The 
last two questions were on a four-point Likert scale (ranging from 4-High to 1-None). Frequency 































General trends in responses to the survey questions can be observed in the frequency 
distributions presented above. Further analyses were performed to determine if the participant 
answers to these questions varied from move to move. Basic statistics (mean, median, mode, and 
standard deviation) are presented in Table 1: 
Move 1 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Mean 4.11 4.03 2.06 2.51 3.46 4.69 3.03 2.63
Median 4 4 2 2 4 5 3 3
Mode 5 6 1 2 4 5 3 3
Standard Deviation 1.37 1.56 1.24 1.34 1.20 0.80 0.66 0.60
Move 2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Mean 3.89 3.78 2.16 2.57 3.30 5.11 3.59 3.14
Median 4 4 2 2 4 5 4 3
Mode 5 4 2 2 4 5 4 3
Standard Deviation 1.62 1.66 0.98 1.07 1.16 0.68 0.50 0.81
Move 3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Mean 4.56 4.64 2.22 2.58 3.33 4.92 3.28 3.33
Median 5 5 2 2 4 5 3 3
Mode 5 5 2 2 4 5 3 3
Standard Deviation 1.15 1.17 1.14 1.09 1.18 0.58 0.57 0.54
Table 1: Summary Statistics For Survey Answers
 
 Statistical significance tests were performed to determine whether the answers to the 
survey questions varied from move to move. The difference in means tests using a t-statistic with 
a 95% significance level indicates that respondents answered with statistically significant 
differences in five of the eight questions as measure by this test statistic.  
 Question 1 asks participants to respond to the following statement: “The total amount of 
tracks my country cell received from other countries during this move influenced my cell’s 
decision making.”  The mean response on a scale of 1 to 6 in Move 3 (mean=4.56) was 
significantly higher than the mean response in Move 2 (mean=3.89). Question 2 asks participants 
to respond to the following statement: “The level of detail my country cell received from other 
countries during this move influenced my cell’s decision making.” Again, the mean response in 
Move 3 (mean=4.64) was significantly higher than the mean response in Move 2 (mean=3.78). 
These statistically significant differences reflect the fact that players were much more involved 
in direct negotiations and quid pro quo arrangements during the Bilateral information-sharing 
model framework than they were during the Coalition information-sharing model framework. 
The survey results from these two questions may partially explain why the level of detailed 
information was less during Move 3 than it was during Move 2 contrary to the supposition 
offered in H3. 
 Question 6 asks participants to respond to the following statement: “The information 
made available to my country cell during this move would help support my country’s national 
security objectives.” The results of the analysis of these responses to this question may also help 
to explain why H3 was not supported. The mean response on a scale of 1 to 6 in Move 2 
(mean=5.11) was statistically significantly higher than the mean response in Move 1 





Move 3 (mean=4.92).  The inference here would be that moving from a Global unrestricted 
information-sharing model to a Coalition information-sharing model creates an environment 
where shared information is perceived to be a significant incremental benefit. While the mean 
response to the question following Move 3 is higher than the mean response after Move 1, the 
difference is not as pronounced as it is during Move 2 (and statistically insignificant at the 95% 
confidence level).  
 Question 7 asks participants to respond to the following statement: “Overall, the Global 
(Coalition, Bilateral) Information Sharing model enabled my country cell to share a low, 
medium, or high amount of information held by my country.”  The mean response on a scale of 1 
to 4 in Move 2 (mean=3.59) was statistically significantly higher than the mean response in 
Move 1 (mean=3.03) and higher than the mean response in Move 3 (mean=3.28). Based on these 
survey results, the amount of information that players perceive themselves as able to share peaks 
within the Coalition information-sharing model framework. These results support H2 (Coalition 
model has more volume than Global model) and also help reject H3 (lowest volume and most 
detail in the Bilateral model). 
 Finally, Question 8 asks participants to respond to the following statement: 
“Overall, the Global (Coalition, Bilateral) Information Sharing model enabled my country cell to 
share information that was of low, medium or high sensitivity.”  The mean response on a scale of 
1 to 4 in Move 1 (mean=2.63) was statistically significantly lower than the mean response in 
Move 2 (mean=3.14) and Move 3 (mean=3.33). These results tend to contradict observations of 
player actions during the game as well as some of the earlier survey questions.  Here, 
respondents seem to indicate that the Bilateral information-sharing model is the framework 
where they were best able to share sensitive data.  
 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
71 
 
 
 
 
 
UNCLASSIFIED 
 
1 
 
 
